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Criminal Procedure -Regulatory Statutes and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination
Governmental use of self-disclosure to obtain information creates
serious conflicts between the necessity of the government to have such
information in order to carry out its legitimate regulatory functions and
the privilege against self-incrimination contained in the fifth amendment
to the United States Constitution.' The character and purpose of the
required information are in large part non-criminal and regulatory, but
since it is possible that the information may be used in a subsequent
criminal proceeding, it is difficult to determine exactly when the privilege
should apply. In addition, because the standards for applying the fifth
amendment privilege have been developed primarily in the criminal,
testimonial setting, rather than in the regulatory, reporting setting, it is
necessary to determine if the same standards should be applied in both
contexts.2
In California v. Byers 3 the Supreme Court was faced with deter-
mining whether the standards developed in the criminal setting should
apply in the regulatory field. The defendant has been indicted for viola-
tion of a California statute4 which in essence provided that the driver of
a vehicle involved in an accident would immediately stop, locate the
owner of any damaged property, and give the owner his name and
address. 5 The defendant demurred to the indictment, claiming that com-
pulsory compliance with the statute violated his privilege against self-
incrimination.' The lower court overruled the demurrer, but a writ of
prohibition was granted by the Superior Court, Mendocino County,
'"No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment was held applicable to the states in
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964).
2See generally Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination and the Government's Need for Information, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 103
(P. Kurland ed. 1966).
3402 U.S. 424 (1971).
4CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 20002(A)(1) (West 1971):
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to any property
including vehicles shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and shall
then and there. . . locate and notify the owner or person in charge of such property of
the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle involved . . ..
5The defendant was also charged with violation of CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 21750 (West 197 1),
which provides sanctions for the failure to pass another vehicle in a safe manner.
'Byers v. Justice Court for the Ukiah Judicial District, 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 1042, 458 P.2d 465,
467, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553, 555 (1969).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
restraining further proceedings on the ground that the statute was a
violation of Byers' asserted privilege. 7 The superior court's ruling was
affirmed by the California Supreme Court, which determined that the
defendant faced substantial hazards of self-incrimination.8 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed on the grounds
that the privilege did not apply under the facts of the case.'
This note will discuss the effect of Byers upon the application of the
standards developed in the criminal setting, as opposed to those promul-
gated in regulatory cases, and the factors which should be considered by
the Court in determining which standards are to be applied. An under-
standing of the ramifications of the Court's decision requires knowledge
of the scope and application of the fifth amendment privilege as deve-
loped by previous Court decisions.
Even though the language of the fifth amendment is specifically
limited to criminal cases,10 the Supreme Court has held that the privilege
must "have a broad construction in favor of the right which it is in-
tended to secure."'" The ability to invoke the privilege is not dependent
upon the nature of the proceedings in which testimony is sought 2 but
has been extended "wherever the answer might tend to subject to crimi-
nal responsibility him who gives it."'13 The central standards which have
been developed to determine when the privilege against self-
incrimination is applicable are the requirements that there be a "sub-
stantial probability of incrimination"' 4 and that the risks of incrimina-
tion be "real and appreciable."'' 5 However, it is important to emphasize
the distinction between the application of these standards in the criminal,
testimonial setting and their application in the regulatory area.
71d. at 1042, 458 P.2d at 468, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
81d. at 1047, 458 P.2d at 471, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 559. The California Supreme Court determined
that § 20002 was a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, but instead of nullifying
the statute, it placed a use-restriction on evidence obtained in compliance with the statute. Id. at
1050, 458 P.2d at 743, 80.Cal. Rptr. at 561. The effect of the use-restriction is to prohibit the
introduction of evidence obtained directly or indirectly as a result of compliance with the statute
and consequently to correct the constitutional infirmity of the statute. However, since Byers could
not anticipate that the statute would be made valid by the use-restriction, the California Supreme
Court chose not to punish Byers for his failure to comply with section 20002. Id. at 1057, 458 P.2d
at 477, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
'402 U.S. at 431.
"U.S. CONST. amend. V. See note I supra.
"Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
"McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
IVd.




In the criminal setting, the privilege applies to any answer which
might provide "a link in the chain of evidence."' 6 The privilege is a
personal one,' 7 and the determination of whether the privilege applies to
a particular question is largely the responsibility of the individual res-
pondent. The privilege is confined to "instances where the individual has
reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.' 8 How-
ever, since the factors which motivate a party to invoke the privilege are
usually known only to that party, the participation of the trial court in
determining what is "reasonable" is very limited, and the privilege can
be invoked any time its application is remotely plausible.19 As a prere-
quisite to requiring an individual to answer a question which the trial
court does not consider incriminating, it is necessary that it be "per-
fectly clear from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the
case . . . that the answers cannot possibly have . . . a tendency to
incriminate." 0
These liberal standards are necessary since if the defendant were
required to prove the risk of incrimination before his refusal to answer
would be permitted, proof of that risk might be sufficient to incriminate
him. The difficulty is that the level of proof necessary to establish clearly
the application of the privilege also might be sufficient to establish guilt.
Therefore, the defendant must be able to invoke the privilege without
completely establishing its application,2' and the judiciary must inter-
vene only where the application of the privilege would be patently fri-
volous.2
In contrast to the well developed standards in the criminal, testimo-
nial setting,23 the standards which have been applied to self-disclosed
information in the regulatory area are of recent development. In
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board,24 the petitioners had
been ordered by the Subversive Activities Control Board to register as
16Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950).
1TRogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951), citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-
70 (1906).
"
8Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951), citing Mason v. United States, 244 U.S.
362, 365 (1917).
"See L. MAYER, SHALL VE AMEND THE FiFrH AMENDMENT? 233-41 (1959).
"Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 580 (1892), citing Temple v. Commonwealth, 75
Va. 892, 898 (1881).
2
'United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 34 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
2L. MAYER, supra note 19.
"Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
2382 U.S. 70 (1965).
1971]
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members of the Communist Party. They had refused to do so, invoking
the privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court affirmed the
right of the petitioners to invoke the privilege, declaring that the required
registration was potentially incriminating since it could be used as evid-
ence in a criminal prosecution.2
Albertson developed three general criteria to determine whether a
"substantial risk of incrimination" existed: (1) whether the statute was
directed at a highly select group, (2) whether the group against whom
the statute was directed were inherently suspect of criminal activity, and
(3) whether the area towards which the statute was directed was per-
meated with criminal statutes. 2 These criteria were applied in Marchetti
v, United Statesrt and Grosso v. United States,28 both of which dealt
with regulations relating to gambling, and in Haynes v. United States, 2
which concerned the registration of firearms. 3 Although the latter cases
dealt with different regulatory schemes, by applying the Albertson cri-
teria the Court was able to decide with relative certainty that "real
risks" of incrimination existed not only for the particular petitioners
involved in the case but also for the entire class of persons of whom they
were typical. These decisions seem correct, since in each case the close
relationship between the information required and the criminal activity
involved would result in substantial risks of incrimination for any indi-
vidual who supplied the required information.
It is important to emphasize that while the Court developed and
applied the new standards for the regulatory area, it used them only as
a measure of the indiviaual standards. 3' The Court did not decide if the
individual standards discussed previously should be abandoned in the
regulatory area, primarily because such a decision was not necessary.
When the Court found that the class of persons that the statute was
directed against was faced with substantial hazards of incrimination, it
naturally followed that the Court would find that the petitioners, as
individual members of that class, would face similar hazards. The deter-
'Bld. at 80. "Such an admission of membership may be used to prosecute the registrant under
the membership clause of the Smith Act. ... Id. at 77.
211d. at 79.
-390 U.S. 39 (1968).
-390 U.S. 62 (1968).
29390 U.S. 85 (1968).
3°See also Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (narcotics). But cf. Minor v. United States,
396 U.S. 87 (1969) (narcotics).
31402 U.S. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 50
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mination that by the Albertson standards the privilege was applicable
to the entire class precluded the necessity of any determination of the
availability of the privilege to the particular individuals involved, since
"reasonable cause" to believe there was a risk of incrimination would
exist wherever the Albertson standards were met. However, although it
is true that substantial hazards as to a class of persons would result in
substantial hazards to the petitioner who is a member of that class, a
determination of substantial hazards according to the personal stan-
dards ("reasonable cause") does not necessarily indicate substantial
hazards for the entire class. For example, in California v. Byers the
petitioner was faced with substantial hazards according to the individual
standards,3 2 but the class that the statute was directed against was not
faced with similar hazards according to the regulatory standards deve-
loped in Albertson. The alternatives available to the court were to apply
the individual standards and effectively nullify a valid statute33 (even
without proof that other drivers faced hazards similar to the petitioner)
or to apply the Albertson standards and deny the petitioner's claim of
the privilege.34 Given these alternatives, it was necessary for the Court
"Id. at 438-39 (Harlan, J., concurring); Mansfield, supra note 2, at 121-24.
As an alternative to complete nullification of the hit-and-run statute, the California Supreme
Court imposed a use-restriction on information obtained in compliance with the statute. "If the
disclosures compelled by sec. 20002 of the Vehicle Code and the fruits of such disclosures may not
be used in a criminal prosecution relating to the accident, the requirements of the privilege against
self-incrimination are met." Byers v. Justice Court for the Ukiah Judicial District, 71 Cal. 2d 1039.
1050, 458 P.2d 465,473, 80 Cal. Rtpr. 553, 561 (1969).
However attractive a use-restriction may be in theory, it is the opinion of the writer that the
practical effect of the use-restriction would be to preclude many criminal prosecutions for traffic
offenses and require the ultimate abandonment of the hit-and-run statute. The only appropriate
application of a use-restriction is to instances in which the information to be restricted is not
intricately related to a larger statutory system; otherwise the effect of the use-restriction is to inhibit
the operation of the entire regulatory scheme. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 58-59
(1968).
For example, in Byers the use-restriction would prohibit the use not only of information
obtained directly by compliance with the statute (the name, address, and concommitant identifica-
tion as a driver involved in an accident) but also any evidence "tainted" by the original compliance.
Since as a practical matter it would be impossible to determine if evidence had been obtained by
compliance with the statute or by independent police investigation, almost any person who complied
with the hit-and-run statute would be immune from criminal prosecution. Considering its effect
upon California's entire system of automobile regulation, the imposition of a use-restriction was
not a viable alternative to the disposition of the Byers case.
The development and application of the individual standards and the Albertson standards in
previous cases required a decision within the context of these standards, and the Court was not free
to create different standards for a Byers-type situation. In theory, of course, alternatives to the two
established standards were available.
19713
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to determine explicitly or implicitly that the individual standards did not
apply in this regulatory setting.
In the Supreme Court decision, a plurality of the Court determined
that according to the Albertson standards, the disclosures in Byers (the
name and address of the driver) "simply do not entail the kind of sub-
stantial risk of self-incrimination involved in Marchetti, Grosso, and
Haynes."" The Court stated that since the California statute was di-
rected at the public-at-large and since most accidents did not result in
criminal prosecutions, it could not consider drivers involved in accidents
either a select group or highly suspect of criminal activity.3"
Moreover, that the plurality chose to ignore completely the indi-
vidual standards which had been developed in the criminal setting re-
quires the obvious conclusion that the personal standards were consid-
ered inapplicable in a regulatory setting. The failure to consider the
individual standards largely explains the difference in opinion between
the plurality and the dissents, since the conclusions of each depended
primarily upon the frame of reference within which the privilege was
applied. The plurality dealt with the broad relationship between the
privilege and the hit-and-run statute, while both dissents focused upon
the risks of self-incrimination faced by the respondent. 3 The dissenters
recognized the existence of the Albertson standards but used them only
as a means of determining the application of the personal standards.
However, regardless of whether the Albertson standards or the indi-
vidual standards had prevailed, the effect of a decision to accord the
privilege would have been the same. Because of the limitations within
which the case had to be decided,3" the plurality and the dissents could
only decide whether the statute did or did not violate the privilege against
self-incrimination as to the entire class of persons toward whom it was
directed. While the dissents purported to be concerned only with deter-
1402 U.S. at 431.
uld.
-"While there were separate dissenting opinions by Justice Black and Justice Brennan, Justice
Brennan explicitly recognized his use of the personal standards:
Contrary to the plurality opinion, I do not believe that we are called upon to determine
the broad and abstract question "whether the constitutional privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination is infringed by California's so-called 'hit and run' statute ... .
[Quoting the plurality opinion.] I believe that we are called upon to decide the question
presented by this case, which is whether California may punish [the] respondent, over
his claim of the privilege against self-incrimination . . ..
Id. at 468.
uSee note 34 and accompanying text supra.
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mining the respondent's personal risk of incrimination and consequently
applied the individual standards, their decision would have reached far
beyond that determination. The effect of their opinion would have been
to nullify the entire statute.39
Consequently, the real issue faced by the Court was not whether to
focus on the broad class affected by the statute (all drivers involved in
accidents) or on the individual respondent, because any decision would
have affected the entire class. The real question was which standard
would be used to determine if the statute should be held to violate the
privilege of nearly all drivers who were involved in accidents: the per-
sonal risks faced by the respondent, or the Albertson standards. In view
of the fact that the result of the Court's decision would have been the
application of the privilege to the entire class of persons affected by the
statute, regardless of which standard was applied, the decision of the
plurality favoring the class standard was the only satisfactory resolution
of the conflict.
The personal standards were developed as a result of the particular
difficulties caused by requiring a witness to prove the risk of incrimina-
tion that he faced. They should not be applied in settings other than the
type that necessitated them,40 since the necessity of allowing the privilege
to be asserted whenever a person has "reasonable cause" to believe that
he will be incriminated minimizes the role of the judiciary in the determi-
nation of when the privilege applies and results in abuse of the privilege. 41
The personal standards are not necessary in the regulatory setting, since
311n Byers, the ability of California to punish drivers who failed to comply with the hit-and-
run statute would have been severely restricted by the application of the individual standards.
Almost all drivers who failed to stop at the scene of an accident could successfully claim that they
had reasonable cause to believe a risk of self-incrimination existed, and consequently they could
not be punished under the hit-and-run statute. Without enforcement the statute would be worthless.
0In the testimonial setting there is no effective way for the trial court to determine the incrimi-
natory nature of an answer other than requiring the respondent to explain the reasons for his refusal.
Since the circumstances under which an answer is given and the relationship of that answer to the
respondent are unique, the consequence has been to allow the privilege to be invoked whenever
"reasonable cause" exists. In situations in which the court can determine the incriminatory nature
of a response without explanation from the respondent, the standard of reasonable cause is inappro-
priate and should not be applied. In that situation, it is possible for the court to make an indepen-
dent assessment of the risk of incrimination.
"In the criminal setting, the effect of the individual standards is to deny testimony only to a
particular court, and countervailing circumstances require continued toleration of the abuse which
results. In the regulatory setting, the effect of applying such standards may be the nullification of
an entire statute, and the importance of that statute must be continually recognized. California v.
Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 448 (197 1) (Harlan, J., concurring).
1971]
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there is an alternative for determining when the privilege applies which
avoids the defects of the personal standards. The risk of incrimination
resulting from compliance with a statute will remain relatively constant,
since the information to be elicited is limited and specifically defined by
statute and a judicial determination of the general incriminatory nature
of a statute is possible. Unfortunately, although the information re-
quired and the setting in which such information is given will remain
constant enough to allow a determination of the risk to the average
individual, it is not possible for such a determination to anticipate the
particular characteristics of an individual which might make compliance
with the statute incriminating. It is both theoretically and practically
possible that because of his personal characteristics someone will be
incriminated by any required compliance. The decision as to whether the
risks faced by those few persons necessitates the nullification of the
statute will depend upon such factors as the nature and detail of the
information required, the access of prosecuting authorities to the infor-
mation, and the importance of the regulatory scheme as well as the
A lbertson standards.
Applying the individual standards in a regulatory setting such as
Byers could also involve the use of the personal risks of the defendant
as a measure of the risks faced by the entire class he represents, when in
fact there might be little relation between the two. That is, there could
be no guarantee that other members of the class faced the same risks of
incrimination as did the involved party. The result could be nullification
of an important regulatory measure without sufficient justification.
Consequently, in a Byers-type setting it is necessary to ignore the per-
sonal standards and to apply the class standards exclusively.
The Albertson standards (the select group, highly suspect of crimi-
nal activity, in an area permeated by criminal statutes) provide a reason-
able measure of the risks of incrimination that are faced by the entire
class of persons against whom a statute is directed. However, it is impor-
tant that these standards do not become either absolute or the object of
semantic exercises. Additional standards, such as the access which pro-
secuting authorities have to the required information and the detail of
the information required, should be added when they will facilitate the
ultimate decision of the court. By continually recognizing that the pur-
pose behind such standards is the determination of the risk of incrimina-
tion faced by an entire class, it may be possible to sustain the legitimate
purpose of regulatory schemes and still protect the essence of the pri-
vilege against self-incrimination.
J. CRAIG LILLIE
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